We explore a view of the crisis as a shock to investor sentiment that led to the collapse of a bubble or pyramid scheme in …nancial markets. We embed this view in a standard model of the …nancial accelerator and explore its empirical and policy implications. In particular, we show how the model can account for: (i) a gradual and protracted expansionary phase followed by a sudden and sharp recession; (ii) the connection (or lack of connection!) between …nancial and real economic activity and; (iii) a fast and strong transmission of shocks across countries. We also use the model to explore the role of …scal policy.
History shows that capitalist economies alternate between expansions and recessions. Thus, even in the heights of the expansion that went from the mid 1990s to the subprime mortgage crisis in the summer of 2007 it was widely understood that a recession would someday hit the world economy. But nobody anticipated what has happened since. The depth of the current recession and the blazing speed with which it has propagated across industries and countries far exceeds even the most pessimistic scenarios. In fact, we need to go back to the Great Depression of the 1930s to …nd a crisis of a similar magnitude and global scope. It is still not clear however that the lessons we learned from that earlier crisis are useful to understand what is going on today.
As everybody else, macroeconomists have been taken by surprise by the unfolding of events.
Even worse, providing an accurate diagnosis of the problem and coming up with clear-cut policy prescriptions has proved to be a di¢ cult challenge. Part of the reason for this, of course, is that state-of-the-art macroeconomic models used for policy analysis are poorly adapted to this task.
These models typically emphasize nominal rigidities and labor market frictions, and downplay the role of …nancial frictions. As a profession, we must go back to the drawing board and reverse these priorities. To understand the current crisis we need models that place …nancial frictions at center stage.
Recent attempts to do this build on the seminal contributions by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) who developed models of the "…nancial accelerator" mechanism. 1 These models were designed to show how …nancial frictions amplify the impact of traditional macroeconomic shocks through their e¤ects on net worth. The intuition is simple: the role of …nancial markets is to intermediate funds from those that have them (i.e. the savers or creditors) to those who know what to do with them (i.e. the entrepreneurs or borrowers). This intermediation is useful because it raises the average e¢ ciency of the economy and thus the welfare of its inhabitants. In order for this intermediation to be feasible, however, savers need guarantees from entrepreneurs that the funds they lend them (plus an attractive enough return!) will be paid back once the investments give their fruits. The net worth of entrepreneurs, i.e. the amount of future funds that they can pledge today to creditors, is akin to those guarantees. When net worth is low, entrepreneurs cannot borrow enough and the economy operates at low levels of e¢ ciency. When net worth is high, entrepreneurs can borrow enough and the economy operates at high levels of e¢ ciency.
There are two alternative ways of using the …nancial accelerator model to think about the current crisis. The …rst one is based on the notion that, as a result of unprecedented changes in the …nancial system, the …nancial accelerator mechanism has become very powerful at amplifying traditional macroeconomic shocks. Consequently, small "real" shocks that a¤ect the e¢ ciency of investment or the productivity of …nancial intermediation can now unleash very large contractions of credit and deep recessions. This view thus stresses the amplifying role of …nancial markets, but it still requires us to identify the speci…c shock to economic fundamentals that pushed the world economy into such a severe recession.
A second and complementary way of using the model is based on the notion that, instead of a small macroeconomic shock of the traditional kind, the world economy has su¤ered a large shock to investor sentiment that has drastically reduced net worth. Although intuitively appealing, it is hard to articulate this view because we lack a formal model of such shocks. Our main goal in writing these notes is to provide such a model. We show how, within the …nancial accelerator framework, changes in investor sentiment a¤ect the market valuation of …rms and therefore their net worth. In particular, investor optimism gives rise to bubbles that increase the price of …rms. These bubbles are useful because they raise net worth, leading to a credit expansion and a boom. When investors become pessimistic, these bubbles burst and net worth falls, leading to a credit contraction and a recession.
This alternative perspective amounts to more than just an academic exercise. On the empirical side, introducing bubbles in the …nancial accelerator model allows us to provide a simple uni…ed narrative of the main macroeconomic developments of the recent past up to the current crisis as a bubbly episode that started in the early 1990s and ended in 2007-08. This narrative …ts very well with the broad turn of events: a steady, protracted expansion phase that entailed signi…cant increases in asset prices and in credit to the private sector, and a fast, severe downturn during which these variables collapsed (see Figure 1) . It also provides a potential explanation to the speed and the strength with which shocks spread across sectors and countries. More generally, the introduction of bubbles in a model of …nancial frictions can provide answers to two burning questions for current macroeconomics: (i) Why do asset (stock, housing, ...) prices ‡uctuate so much and in ways that seem so unrelated to fundamentals? and (ii) How is it that these ‡uctuations in asset prices have such signi…cant e¤ects on real activity? The importance of these questions goes beyond understanding the events of recent years: as the postwar experience of industrialized economies shows, substantial ‡uctuations in asset prices are not uncommon and, when they happen, they are typically associated with substantial macroeconomic developments. 2 On the policy side, viewing the crisis as the collapse of a bubble has far reaching implications for the role of …scal policy as a stabilization tool. 3 The case for a …scal stimulus package and its optimal design depend crucially on whether the shock that led to the crisis is a traditional macroeconomic shock or a shock to investor sentiment. If the latter, we describe the type of …scal package that can restore the economy to its pre-crisis path. Whether this package is feasible, though, depends crucially on the credibility of the government. When credibility is low, attempts to undo the crisis through the use of …scal policy might merely cause it to move across markets, from private …nancial markets to public-debt markets.
In thinking about the origin and consequences of the current crisis, there are di¤erent, but complementary, lines of research that can be pursued. One approach is to focus on the particular details and institutional arrangements of …nancial markets, emphasizing the role of speci…c features -like regulation or the incentives of certain market participants -in generating and fueling the crisis. 4 An alternative approach is to take a step back and think instead of the general features that have characterized …nancial markets, and more generally the macroeconomy, in recent years.
This approach, which we adopt in these notes, is also followed in recent papers by Kiyotaki (2009) and Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) . As mentioned already, Gertler and Kiyotaki draw on the insights of the …nancial accelerator literature in order to interpret the current crisis. We di¤er from them by modeling the crisis as a shock to investor sentiment that ended a bubbly episode. Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas also view the crisis as the bursting of a bubble, although they do not provide a formal model of how bubbles can arise in equilibrium. They argue that the bubble was fueled by a shortage of …nancial assets in the world economy and focus on the chronology of events that followed its bursting.
Methodologically, we build on the traditional literature on rational bubbles that goes back to Samuelson (1958) . Tirole (1985) analyzed the conditions for the existence of such bubbles in the context of a production economy. Our model is close to Tirole's with the di¤erence that, in our 2 In analyzing housing and equity prices in industrialized economies during the postwar period, IMF (2002) found that equity price busts occured on average once every 13 years and entailed price declines of about 45 percent, whereas housing busts occured on average every 20 years and involved price declines of about 30 percent. Both equity and housing price busts were associated with output losses re ‡ecting declines in both consumption and investment.
3 In this regard, this paper is related to who studied the design of monetary policy in a …nancial-accelerator model with bubbles. Although similar in spirit, both papers di¤er substantially on their emphasis. In the model of Bernanke and Gertler, the emphasis is on policy analysis: asset bubbles are introduced exogenously and not as an equilibrium phenomenon. In these notes, instead, the emphasis is in the development of a consistent framework to study the interaction between asset bubbles and the …nancial accelerator mechanism. 4 For such an account, see Brunnermeier (2009). setup, the presence of …nancial frictions: (i) relaxes the conditions for the existence of bubbles and; (ii) it implies that bubbles can be expansionary and increase credit and output. Azariadis and Smith (1993) were, to the best of our knowledge, the …rst to study the relationship between contracting frictions and the existence of rational bubbles. Our …nding regarding the relationship between …nancial frictions and the possibility of expansionary bubbles is related to recent results by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) , Kraay and Ventura (2007) , Farhi and Tirole (2009) and Kocherlakota (2009) . Our framework di¤ers from these last papers in two crucial respects, though.
The …rst is that we study expansionary bubbles in the context of a standard production economy.
The second is that, as in Martin and Ventura (2010) , bubbles in our setting can arise even if all investments are dynamically e¢ cient in the economy's fundamental equilibrium. 5
These notes are organized as follows. Section 1 develops a stylized version of the …nancial accelerator model and explores the e¤ects of traditional macroeconomic shocks. Section 2 shows that the model has additional equilibria with bubbly episodes and uses them to interpret the crisis.
Sections 3 and 4 extend the framework to study how policy can react to the bursting of a bubble, and how bubbly episodes are transmitted across countries. Section 5 concludes.
A canonical model of …nancial frictions and business cycles
In a recent paper, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) develop a "canonical framework to help organize thinking about credit market frictions and aggregate economic activity in the context of the current crisis"(p.1). This framework is built around an agency cost that limits the ability of …rms to pledge future resources to their creditors. This section develops a stripped-down version of this framework and uses it in the way that Gertler and Kiyotaki suggest.
Basic setup
Our model builds on Samuelson's two-period overlapping-generations structure. The world economy contains an in…nite sequence of generations, indexed by t 2 ( 1; +1). Each generation contains a continuum of individuals of size one, indexed by i 2 I t . Individuals maximize expected old-age consumption, i.e. U it = E t fc it+1 g; where U it and c it+1 are the utility function when young and 5 There is also a literature on bubbles and economic growth that is closely related to this paper. Saint-Paul (1992), Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) , and King and Ferguson (1993) extend the Samuelson-Tirole model to economies with endogenous growth due to externalities in capital accumulation. In their models, bubbles slow down the growth rate of the economy. Olivier (2000) uses a similar model to show how, if tied to R&D …rms, bubbles might foster technological progress and growth. the old-age consumption of individual i of generation t. To …nance their consumption, individuals supply one unit of labor when young. Since individuals only care about old age consumption, they save their entire labor income. Since individuals are risk-neutral, they always invest their savings so as to maximize their expected return.
The world economy also contains an in…nite sequence of generations of …rms, indexed by j 2 J t .
The set J t contains all …rms that were created, in period t or before and are still operating. Firms produce output with a Cobb-Douglas technology: F (l jt ; k jt ) = l 1 jt k jt ; where l jt and k jt are the labor and capital used by …rm j in period t. Firms also produce capital with a technology that uses one unit of output in period t to produce A jt units of capital in period t + 1. The capital stock of …rm j evolves as follows:
where Z jt is the investment of …rm j, and 2 [0; 1] is the rate of depreciation. To motivate the need for intermediation, we make two assumptions about the life cycle of …rms. The …rst one is that investment e¢ ciency is high when a …rm starts and then stabilizes at a lower level when it becomes mature:
where J N t is the set of "new"…rms in period t, i.e. the set of …rms that are created in period t and start producing output in period t + 1. We refer to t as the investment e¢ ciency and assume that it ‡uctuates randomly with t > 1. The second assumption is that only a subset I E t of generation t is capable of starting a …rm. We refer to this subset as the "entrepreneurs" and assume that it has measure " 2 [0; 1]. Everybody can manage an old …rm.
Workers and savings are allocated to …rms in the labor and …nancial markets. The labor market is competitive and all workers and …rms can trade in it with zero or negligible transaction costs.
Maximization then implies that:
where w t is the wage rate per unit of labor. Equation (3) is the labor demand of …rm j, which results from hiring labor until its marginal product equals the wage. Since the aggregate supply of labor is one, market clearing implies that:
where k t R j2Jt k jt is the aggregate capital stock. Since all …rms use the same capital-labor ratio, this must be the aggregate one. Thus, Equation (4) says that the wage equals the marginal product of labor evaluated at the aggregate capital-labor ratio.
We turn next to the key piece of the model, namely, the …nancial market. This market consists of a credit market where individuals lend to …rms, and a stock market where individuals buy and sell old …rms. Both markets are competitive and all savers and …rms can trade in them with zero or negligible transaction costs. Firms can write contingent credit contracts, but there is an agency cost that limits the overall ability of …rms to obtain credit. In particular, …rms can commit or pledge to their creditors only a fraction t of their resources in period t. We refer to t as the …nancial friction and assume that it ‡uctuates randomly within the unit interval. We adopt the convention that, in period t, individuals know the realization of shocks with index t (i.e. t and t ), but they do not know the realizations of shocks with index t + 1 (i.e. t+1 and t+1 ). The resources of the …rm in period t + 1 consist of the revenue from sales net of labor costs, i.e. F (l jt+1 ; k jt+1 ) w t+1 l jt+1 , plus the …rm's resale or market value, i.e. V jt+1 . Therefore, we have that in each possible state of nature in period t + 1 the following constraint holds:
where f jt is the credit that …rm j obtains in the credit market in period t, and R t+1 is the (gross) ex-post return to loans. Since R t+1 might be contingent on any variable which is known in period t + 1, we refer to E t R t+1 , as the interest rate. The right-hand side of Equation (5) captures the concept of net worth. That is, the amount of future resources that …rms can use as a collateral to obtain credit today. The shock t captures the quality of the legal system and other institutional arrangements that support credit.
Maximization implies that non-entrepreneurs will lend and buy old …rms simultaneously if and only if the expected return to owning an old …rm equals the interest rate: 6
new capital minus credit. Then, in period t+1 the owner obtains the revenue from sales net of labor and …nancing costs plus the resale value of the …rm. Maximization also implies that entrepreneurs start new …rms only if the expected return to doing so is not lower than the interest rate:
where the maximization is once again subject to the constraint in Equation (5). Unlike old …rms, new …rms start without capital and their owners, who are also their creators, do not have to pay a price for them, i.e. k jt = V jt = 0 if j 2 J N t . The next step is to determine the interest rate and …rm prices that clear the credit and stock market. We are interested in equilibria in which …rms are credit constrained. Our assumption that credit contracts can be fully state contingent implies that, in those equilibria, Equation (5) must hold with equality in all states of nature since …rms have borrowed as much as possible against their future net worth. We conjecture that the following interest rate and …rm prices clear the credit and stock market,
and then verify this conjecture. Equation (8) says that the interest rate equals the return to producing a unit of capital within an old …rm. Equation (9) says that the price of a …rm equals the cost of replacing the capital that it owns. Ideally, all investment should take place within new …rms, as these have a technological advantage when producing new capital. This is not possible however if the …nancial friction is severe enough. The conjecture in Equations (8) and (9) turns out to be correct if the equilibrium is ine¢ cient and some investment is carried out within old …rms.
At the proposed interest rate and …rm prices, entrepreneurs strictly prefer to start new …rms than to lend or purchase old …rms. Moreover, since the interest rate is below the return to investing in new …rms the owners of these …rms ask for as much credit as possible. Since the optimal …nancing contract ensures that Equation (5) is binding in all states of nature, we …nd credit by adding this constraint across states of nature: 7
7 Adding up Equation (5) across states of nature yields:
Not surprisingly, credit increases with the wealth of entrepreneurs and their investment e¢ ciency, and decreases with the …nancial friction.
At the proposed interest rate and …rm prices, non-entrepreneurs are indi¤erent between lending and purchasing old …rms. If they choose the latter, they are also indi¤erent regarding the amount of investment and external …nancing of their …rms. As a group, non-entrepreneurs purchase the stock of old …rms, give credit to new …rms and use any savings left to produce new capital within their old …rms. To verify that markets clear, we must check that this group has enough savings to do all of this:
where
We assume from now on that this condition holds and, as a result, the conjectured interest rate and …rm prices are veri…ed. 8 Aggregating Equation (1) across …rms, we …nd that: 9
Equation (12) is the law of motion of the capital stock. The dynamics of this economy are akin to those of a Solow model with shocks to the average e¢ ciency of investment. From any initial capital stock, the economy converges towards a steady state in which the capital stock ‡uctuates within a range that is de…ned by the support of the shocks. These shocks might originate in the investment technology ( t ) or the …nancial friction ( t ), but have similar macroeconomic e¤ects as they both work through the average e¢ ciency of investment.
Equation (10), we substitute in the conjectured interest rate and …rm prices and solve for fjt. 8 This requires that:
In terms of the primitives of the model, this implies that: (i) Et t+1 t < 1 " in all dates and states of nature, and (ii) is high enough. The …rst restriction ensures that the credit constraint is tight enough so that, after giving credit to new …rms, non-entreprenurs still have some savings left in their hands. The second restriction ensures …rm prices are su¢ ciently low so that these savings are su¢ cient to purchase the stock of old …rms. 9 Investment spending consists of the savings of the young minus their purchases of old …rms, i.e. wt Vt =
(1 ) k t (1 ) kt. Of this total, new …rms invest " 1 Et t+1 t
(1 ) k t with e¢ ciency t, while the rest is invested by old …rms with e¢ ciency one.
Looking to the crisis through the lens of the canonical model
We are ready to use the canonical model in the way that Gertler and Kiyotaki suggest, namely, as a framework to help organize our thinking about the current crisis. The stylized facts are well known, of course (see Figure 1 ). The world economy entered a long and steady expansion around the mid 1990s, with increases in consumption and investment. The prices of stocks, real estate and other assets grew to unprecedented levels. Intermediation soared, while interest rates fell to historical lows. This expansion lasted more than a decade, leading many to think that the business cycle was over. This might have been too optimistic. But nobody anticipated what happened after the summer of 2007: a sudden and sharp drop in stock and real estate prices, a massive collapse in intermediation and the worse …nancial crisis since the Great Depression. Since then, investment has come to a halt and the world economy has experienced negative growth. We are only now starting to see the light at the end of the tunnel.
The key question, of course, is how did all this happen. Coming up with a convincing explanation for such a sharp and unexpected change in economic outcomes is a fascinating academic challenge with far reaching policy implications. At a deep level, explanations of the crisis fall into one of two rough categories. The …rst one includes explanations based on the notion that something fundamental or technological has happened. These explanations emphasize aggregate resource constraints and view the crisis as a negative shift of these constraints. A second set of explanations start from the premise that nothing fundamental has changed, and that we are only witnessing a massive coordination failure. This second set of explanations emphasize the role of expectations and view the crisis as a negative shift in those.
The canonical model described above o¤ers two alternative, but complementary, explanations of the crisis: a shock to the investment technology, t ; and a shock to the …nancial friction, t .
Both of these shocks are fundamental or technological, although they originate in di¤erent parts of the economy: the corporate or the …nancial sector, respectively. We consider each of them in turn. Figure 2 shows the response of the economy to a transitory shock to the investment technology. 10;11 The di¤erent panels plot the assumed path for the shock ( t ) and the responses of the capital stock (k t ), consumption (c t ), the stock market (V t ), the interest rate (E t R t+1 ) and inter-mediation (f N t ). 12 All variables are shown as deviations from the steady state. The increase in t raises the average e¢ ciency of investment through two channels. For a given allocation of investment, new …rms become more e¢ cient at investing. In addition, their net worth increases, relaxing their credit constraint and allowing them to undertake a larger share of the economy's investment.
The increase in the average e¢ ciency of investment shifts the law of motion of the capital stock upwards and the economy starts transitioning towards a higher steady state. As this happens, the capital stock and consumption increase. In the …nancial market, the interest rate declines, while intermediation and …rm prices increase. When t goes back to its original level, all these changes unwind. The law of motion of the capital stock goes back to its original shape and the capital stock starts declining. Eventually, the economy goes back to its original steady state. Figure 3 shows the response of the economy to a transitory shock to the …nancial friction. 13 We have calibrated the shocks so that the quantitative e¤ect on the average e¢ ciency of investment is the same in Figures 2 and 3. The most remarkable aspect of Figure 3 is that it is almost a carbon copy of Figure 2 . The only di¤erence between these …gures is that Figure 3 shows a larger increase in intermediation. The reason is that shocks to the …nancial friction only a¤ect the average e¢ ciency of investment through one channel: the net worth of …rms increases, relaxing their credit constraint and improving the allocation of investment. This is why a shock to t requires a larger increase in intermediation than a shock to t to obtain the same increase in the average e¢ ciency of investment. Since shocks to t and t are observationally equivalent from a macroeconomic perspective, the only way to tell them apart would be to use microeconomic data to …nd out whether aggregate ‡uctuations in the average e¢ ciency of investment are due to …rms being more productive or having better access to credit.
The model is stylized and much work remains to be done to get it ready for serious quantitative analysis. In particular, it can be extended along various dimensions to strengthen the …nancial accelerator mechanism. 14 But Figures 2 and 3 already show that it is possible to write down a model based on fundamental or technological shocks to the corporate (i.e. t ) and/or the …nancial sector (i.e. t ) that delivers dynamics that are qualitatively consistent with the evidence. Moreover, the notion that it is a drop in aggregate net worth that has caused a collapse in intermediation is 1 2 The response of output and wages mimics that of the capital stock. 1 3 In particular, we assume that Et t+1 = if 0 t < T and Et t+1 = for all t < 0 and t T , with > . To allow for a clean experiment, we assume that t = for all t, and that the economy was already in the steady state in period t = 0.
1 4 Most prominently, ‡uctuations in the relative price of assets (i.e. capital) can feed back into borrowing constraints and exacerbate volatility (see Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) ).
certainly appealing as it conforms to the perceptions of many observers and market participants.
Not surprisingly then, much current research follows this research strategy.
Despite this, we remain unconvinced that the current crisis is the result of a technological or fundamental shock. Even accounting for the amplifying forces of the …nancial system, what particular shock could have caused such a dramatic downturn as the one su¤ered by the world economy? It seems di¢ cult to identify a speci…c technological shock that could underlie such a large change in the investment opportunities faced by …rms. Likewise, it seems di¢ cult to identify a speci…c change in the institutional and/or technological framework of …nancial markets that has so suddenly left them so impaired to do their job. Neither the resources available for intermediation, nor the technology used for it seem to have changed much. This is why we search for an alternative explanation of this crisis, one that can help us understand how output and wealth can fall so much even though resources and technology remain apparently unchanged. We would like to do so by complementing the …nancial accelerator framework, preserving its central feature, namely, the predominant role of …nancial frictions. If successful, such an explanation could shed light on more than the recent past. Even before the current crisis, the large and unpredictable ‡uctuations in the stock and housing markets of recent years hardly mirrored the evolution of technological or fundamental shocks. 15 And, with a longer-term perspective that encompasses the whole of the postwar period, it appears that large ‡uctuations in asset prices (and their macroeconomic implications) have hardly been uncommon. So we search for an explanation of (i) why asset prices move in ways that are unrelated to fundamentals, and (ii) how these movements in asset prices can lead to ‡uctuations in production with unchanged resources. This does not require changing the model, but only the way we look at it. We show this next.
Bubbles as pyramid schemes
What is the price of a …rm? We showed that the canonical model has an equilibrium in which the price of a …rm equals the cost that it would take to replace the capital it owns. This price is often referred to as the fundamental value of a …rm, since it also equals the net present value of all the output that the capital owned by the …rm will ever produce. But the canonical model has many other equilibria in which …rm prices are above their fundamental value. It is customary to refer to these equilibria as bubbly, since they capture the notion of …rms being overvalued or having a bubble. We use these equilibria to sketch an alternative explanation of the current crisis.
Setup with bubbles
We solve the model again, conjecturing that the interest rate is still given by Equation (8) but that …rm prices are now given by:
where b jt is the overvaluation or bubble in …rm j. The assumption that …rm prices equal their fundamental value can be expressed as the restriction that b jt = 0 for all j and t. This restriction cannot be justi…ed on a priori grounds but there is always an equilibrium in which it is satis…ed, as we showed in the previous section. Equation (13) already points out to the …rst macroeconomic e¤ect of bubbles: since …rm prices are high, the amount of savings devoted to purchase the stock of old …rms increases and this reduces the funds available for investment.
At the proposed interest rate and …rm prices, entrepreneurs strictly prefer to start new …rms than to lend or purchase old …rms and, just as before, they ask for as much credit as possible:
Equation (14) points out to the second macroeconomic e¤ect of bubbles: since future …rm prices are high, entrepreneurs are able to obtain more credit and this improves the allocation of investments.
Of course, not any stochastic process for b jt can be part of an equilibrium. Broadly speaking, there are two restrictions or requirements that bubbles must satisfy. The …rst one is that bubbles should grow fast enough to be attractive. At the proposed interest rate and …rm prices, nonentrepreneurs are indi¤erent between lending and purchasing old …rms if and only if:
Equation (15) says that the expected growth rate of bubbles must equal the interest rate. If the growth rate of the bubble were less than the interest rate, owning …rms with a bubble would not be attractive. This cannot be an equilibrium. If the growth rate of the bubble exceeded the interest rate, non-entrepreneurs would want to borrow to purchase bubbly …rms. This cannot be an equilibrium either. The requirement that all bubbles have the same expected growth rate does not mean that all bubbles be correlated though.
The second requirement for a bubble to be part of the equilibrium is that it should not grow too fast. Otherwise, the aggregate bubble would eventually be too large for the young to be able to purchase it and markets would not clear. Knowing this, standard backward-induction arguments would rule out the bubble today. To verify that markets clear, we must check that non-entrepreneurs have enough savings to lend to entrepreneurs and purchase the stock of old …rms. That, is, we must check that Equation (11) holds. We keep assuming that this condition holds and, as a result, the conjectured interest rate and …rm prices are veri…ed. 16 Aggregating Equation (1) across …rms, we …nd that: (16) where (12) and (16) shows that, in principle, the e¤ect of bubbles on capital accumulation is ambiguous. The last two terms of Equation (16) show that purchasing the existing bubble reduces capital accumulation by diverting resources away from investment. Since only non-entrepreneurs purchase bubbly …rms and their investment e¢ ciency is one, the existing bubble crowds out capital one to one. The second term
of Equation (16) shows that the expected bubble expands capital accumulation by relaxing credit constraints, increasing intermediation and the average e¢ ciency of investment. To understand this term, note that the expected bubble raises the net worth of e¢ cient investors by
, which enables them to expand borrowing by a factor of E t t+1 1 E t t+1 t , and each unit borrowed entails an e¢ ciency gain of t 1. 18
To complete the description of the dynamics of the economy, we need to determine the evolution of the aggregate bubble. Aggregating Equation (15) across …rms, we …nd that:
1 6 This requires now that:
where bt R 
That is, the aggregate bubble grows faster than the interest rate because of the creation of new …rms and, with them, new bubbles too. Any sequence for k t ; b t and b N t that satis…es Equations (16) and (17) is an equilibrium, provided that Equation (11) holds in all dates and states of nature.
The dynamics of this economy depend on the dynamics of …rm prices, and we turn to these next.
Bubbly episodes
Bubbly episodes can take place in the canonical model. Generically, the economy ‡uctuates between periods in which b t = b N t = 0 and periods in which b t > 0 and/or b N t > 0. We say that the economy is in the fundamental state if b t = b N t = 0. We say instead that the economy is experiencing a bubbly episode if b t > 0 and/or b N t > 0. A bubbly episode starts when the economy leaves the fundamental state and ends the …rst period in which the economy returns to the fundamental state.
Let z t 2 fF; Bg be a sunspot variable that determines the state of the economy. We refer to z t as investor sentiment. The transition probabilities Pr (z t+1 = F jz t = B ) and Pr (z t+1 = B jz t = F ) could be a function of any endogenous or exogenous variable of the model, and could ‡uctuate randomly over time.
In the fundamental state, …rm prices equal their fundamental values. Each period, there is some probability that a bubble episode starts in the new generation of …rms. When this happens, an aggregate bubble appears and starts to grow according to Equation (17) . This growth in the bubble is due to two factors: (i) as the new …rms become old, their bubble keeps growing at an expected rate that equals the interest rate; and (ii) new bubbles appear in the successive generations of new …rms. Throughout the bubbly episode, there is some probability that the episode ends and the economy reverts to the fundamental state. When this happens, all bubbles burst and …rm prices go back to their fundamental values.
It turns out that this simple model can give rise to a wide array of equilibrium dynamics with bubbly episodes of di¤erent sorts. 19 To simplify the discussion, consider the simple example in which the probability of an episode ending is constant, i.e. Pr (z t+1 = F jz t = B ) = p; and the rate of bubbly creation is also constant, i.e. b N t = b N > 0 when the episode starts and then b N t = n b t until the episode ends, with n > 0. We also assume that Pr (z t+1 = B jz t = F ) is small, so that the fundamental state is similar to the equilibrium of section 1. We use this example throughout the paper for illustrative purposes. It nicely captures the notion of a shock to investor sentiment. In the fundamental state, investors expect bubbles to survive with a low probability and, as a result, investors do not purchase …rms with bubbles. During a bubbly episode, investors expect bubbles to survive with a high probability and new bubbles to appear at a rate that is proportional to the stock of existing bubbles. Both sets of expectations are self-ful…lling and this allows us to interpret transitions between these two states as shocks to investor sentiment.
To be able to graphically describe the dynamics of the bubble during an episode, we further simplify by assuming that there are no other type of shocks, i.e. t = and t = . Moreover, if the rate of depreciation is large, i.e.
1, we can make the model recursive through a simple transformation of variables. De…ne x t as the bubble's share of wealth or savings, i.e.
Then, during a bubbly episode, we can rewrite Equation (17) as follows:
if z t+1 = B and x t+1 = 0 if z t+1 = F . Naturally, the derivation of Equation (18) assumes that Equation (11) holds. This condition can now be rewritten as follows:
The key observation is that the capital stock does not appear in Equations (18) and (19). Any path for x t that that satis…es Equations (18) and (19) in all dates and states of nature is an equilibrium of the economy. Since x t = 0 does this, we trivially have that such a path always exists. Of course, the interesting question is whether more paths are possible and, if so, how do these paths look like. Knowing this, we can then use Equation (16) to determine the associated paths for the capital stock, which is given by
This allows us to interpret bubbly episodes literally as shocks to the law of motion of the economy.
Equations (18) and (19) embody the two requirements for bubbly episodes to be part of an equilibrium, and that we mentioned earlier. The …rst one is that the bubble must be expected to grow fast enough. Otherwise, holding the bubble would not be attractive and nobody would purchase it. This requirement is embodied in Equation (18), which is nothing but a restatement of Equation (15). The second requirement is that the bubble cannot be expected to grow too fast.
Otherwise, it would eventually exceed available funds and it could not be purchased. Knowing this, standard backward-induction arguments would rule out the bubble today. This requirement is embodied in Equation (19) which is nothing but a restatement of Equation (11). Equations (18) and (19) can be used to show that bubbly episodes can happen if is su¢ ciently low.
This example can generate two types of bubbly episodes. The …rst type is the conventional or contractionary bubbly episode emphasized by Tirole (1985) . These episodes occur in economies where some investments are dynamically ine¢ cient in the fundamental state, and they require 20 This condition ensures that bubbles have a negative e¤ect on capital accumulation, as the reduction in investment spending is not compensated by the increase in the average e¢ ciency of investment. Bubbles raise the interest rate and reduce the capital stock. Figure   4 illustrates one of these contractionary episodes. 21 The thick line depicts Equation (18) The second type of bubbly episode is the non-conventional or expansionary one analyzed by Martin and Ventura (2010) . These episodes arise in economies with …nancial frictions, and exist even if all investments are dynamically e¢ cient in the fundamental state. These episodes require that ( 1) n 1 > 1. 22 This condition ensures that bubbles have a positive e¤ect on capital accumulation, as the reduction in investment spending is compensated by the increase in the average e¢ ciency of investment. These bubbles reduce the interest rate and increase the capital stock. 2 0 Episodes of this type exist if Equation (18) is below the 45 degree line for some xt x. This requires that:
2 1 Since they naturally assume that = 1 in order to illustrate the recursive characterization of x, Figures 4 and 5 are parametrized di¤erently than the rest.
2 2 Episodes of this type exist if Equation (18) is below the 45 degree line for some xt x. This requires that:
Interestingly, these episodes might look quite di¤erent from the conventional ones. In particular, episodes might start with a small bubble that gains momentum over time. These bubbles can become very large before suddenly bursting.
Looking to the crisis through the lens of the canonical model, again
The canonical model therefore o¤ers a third explanation of the crisis: a shock to investor sentiment. Since non-conventional or expansionary bubbles are the only ones that stand a chance to be empirically relevant in the present situation, we focus on them in what follows. We would like to stress once more that we are not changing the model of the economy, but only the way to use it.
Rather than looking for fundamental or technological explanations such as shocks to t and t , we instead look for an explanation that relies on a coordination failure by focusing on shocks to z t . Figure 6 shows the response of the economy to a shock to investor sentiment. 23 We have calibrated the shock so that its e¤ects on the capital stock are roughly the same as those of the technological shocks in Figures 2 and 3 . The behavior of the di¤erent macroeconomic variables is similar to those in these previous …gures. The main di¤erence is that …nancial variables tend to ‡uctuate much more in the case of a shock to z t . One reason is that the shock has a direct e¤ect on …rm prices that is absent in the case of shocks to t and/or t . In addition, high asset prices reduce investment spending and this requires even a larger increase in intermediation to generate the same increase in the capital stock.
The start of a bubble generates a positive wealth shock which can literally be described as a transfer from the future. This is a central feature of a pyramid scheme where the initiator claims that, by making him/her a payment now, the other party earns the right to receive a payment from a third person later. By successfully creating and selling a bubble, entrepreneurs assign themselves and sell the "rights"to the savings of a generation living in the very far future or, to be more exact, living at in…nity. This appropriation of rights is a pure windfall or wealth gain for the entrepreneurs.
This wealth shock generates an e¢ ciency gain, as it helps overcome the negative e¤ects of the …nancial friction. The bubble increases the net worth of entrepreneurs and allows new …rms to obtain more credit and invest more. In a very real sense, the bubble is like the oil that greases the machinery that moves …nancial markets. The rights to the future generated by the bubble provide the collateralizable net worth that …nancial markets need to work e¢ ciently. The bubble thus results in an increased average e¢ ciency of investment. This is why the e¤ects of a shock to investor sentiment resemble those of fundamental shocks.
As a research strategy, viewing the current crisis as the bursting of a macroeconomic pyramid scheme or bubble seems to overcome the shortcomings of alternatives that rely on technological shocks. In particular, it explains (i) why asset prices move in ways that are often unrelated to fundamentals; and (ii) why these movements in asset prices can lead to ‡uctuations in production with unchanged resources. Moreover, this alternative view of the crisis fundamentally a¤ects the role of …scal policy as a stabilization tool. We turn to this topic next.
Policy implications
We have modeled the current crisis as a negative shock to net worth that led to a collapse of intermediation and the average e¢ ciency of investment. Is there anything that governments can do to reverse such a situation? If the shock is fundamental or technological, the canonical model cannot provide a meaningful answer to this question since it lacks a good description of the microeconomics of productivity and the …nancial friction. But if the shock is the bursting of a bubble, the canonical model turns out to be quite useful for policy analysis. Keeping with the exploratory spirit of these notes, we add a government to the framework developed above and draw some tentative results.
Setup with a government
Assume next that the world economy contains a government that gives subsidies to …rms and …nances these subsidies by taxing individuals and issuing debt. Unlike much of the recent literature on the crisis, we do not to give the government an advantage over the market as a lender. Instead, we assume the government enforces payments due by using the same legal system and related institutional arrangements as the private sector. 24 This implies that it is not possible to improve the allocation of investments without raising the net worth of new …rms. 25 2 4 For instance, some of the policies advocated by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Curdia and Woodford (2010) are based on the assumption that (at least, after the crisis) the government is better at lending than the private sector.
2 5 Consider a proposal for the government to lend to new …rms. Since the total amount of resources that the legal system can extract from these …rms is …xed, any lending done by the the government uses up an equivalent amount of net worth. If …nanced by issuing debt and/or taxing non-entrepreneurs, government lending crowds out private credit one-to-one. Even worse, if partly …nanced by taxing entrepreneurs, government lending crowds out private credit more than one-to-one. The reason is that taking away resources from entrepreneurs lowers the net worth of their …rms.
Let T it and S jt be the tax levied on individual i and the subsidy given to …rm j in period t.
The government borrows by issuing one-period bonds which yield a (gross) return equal to R d t+1 . As in the case of private debt, we allow this return to be fully contingent and therefore to vary across states of nature. This could re ‡ect a contingent contractual rate, or the government's failure to keep with its contractual obligations. Let d t be the payments made to debtholders in period t.
Then, the government's budget constraint can be written as follows:
where T t R i2It T it and S t R j2Jt S jt . Equation (21) says that the government borrows to make debt payments, i.e. d t , and to …nance the primary budget de…cit, i.e. S t T t .
The presence of the government has no e¤ect on technology, i.e. Equations (1) and (2); or the functioning of the labor market, i.e. Equations (3) and (4). It does however a¤ect the …nancial market in three speci…c ways: (i) there is now an additional market for government debt; (ii) taxes reduce the savings available to purchase …nancial assets; and (iii) subsidies improve the balance sheet of …rms and therefore their net worth. This last e¤ect means that Equation (5) should be replaced by the following one:
Equation (22) recognizes that future subsidies also constitute a source of revenue for the …rm. The conditions for maximization also need to be modi…ed as follows:
Equations (23) and (24) are natural generalizations of Equations (6) and (7). Equation (23) says that maximization by entrepreneurs requires that the expected return to owning an old …rm and holding government debt must equal the interest rate. Equation (24) says that maximization by entrepreneurs implies that starting new …rms must yield a return that is at least as high as the interest rate.
We conjecture that …rm prices and the interest rate on private credit are still given by Equations (13) and (8), respectively. In addition, we conjecture that the expected return on government debt is given by:
Equation (25) says that government debt must o¤er the same expected return as private credit.
This is a direct implication of risk neutrality.
where T it are the taxes levied on the entrepreneur that starts and owns …rm j. Intermediation decreases with taxes on entrepreneurs and increases with subsidies to new …rms.
At the proposed interest rate and …rm prices, non-entrepreneurs are indi¤erent among lending to new …rms, buying government debt or purchasing old …rms. If they choose the latter, they are also indi¤erent regarding the amount of investment and external …nancing of their …rms. As a group, the non-entrepreneurs purchase the stock of old …rms, give credit to new …rms, buy the government debt and use any savings left to produce new capital within their old …rms. To verify that markets clear, we must check now that:
We keep assuming that this condition holds and our conjecture is veri…ed. 26 Aggregating Equation (1) across …rms, we …nd that:
S jt . 27 A comparison of Equations (16) and (28) shows that …scal policy has two 2 6 This requires now that:
Tjt. Note that taxes on entrepreneurs relax this condition while debt and subsidies tighten it. 2 7 Investment spending consists of the savings of the young minus their purchases of old …rms and government debt, e¤ects on capital accumulation. The …rst one is the conventional crowding-out e¤ect, captured by the last two terms of Equation (28). As the debt grows, it absorbs a larger fraction of the savings of the young generation and this diverts resources away from capital accumulation. But there is also a second e¤ect here that is due to the …nancial friction and is captured by the second term of Equation (16). Subsidies to new …rms foster capital accumulation by relaxing credit constraints, increasing intermediation and the average e¢ ciency of investment. For the opposite reasons, taxes to entrepreneurs reduce capital accumulation.
To complete the description of the dynamics of the economy, we still need Equation (17) describing the evolution of the aggregate bubble and, in addition, we need the following equation describing the evolution of …scal variables:
Equation (29) follows from Equations (21) and (25). The equilibrium depends on the …scal policy adopted by the government. A …scal policy is a feasible sequence for taxes and subsidies, i.e. T it and S jt , and a return process R d t+1 satisfying Equation (25). Once this policy has been speci…ed, any sequence for k t , d t , b t and b N t that satis…es Equations (17), (28) and (29) is an equilibrium, provided that Equation (27) holds in all dates and states of nature. We show next how …scal policy works in some of these equilibria.
' Undoing'the crisis?
Let us start with a disclaimer: we do not search for the optimal …scal policy. Instead, we focus on the more modest question of whether the government can use …scal policy to reverse the situation and bring the economy back to the pre-crisis growth path. This might be a desirable goal for most individuals, but not necessarily for all as some might bene…t from the crisis. Moreover, the pre-crisis path might not be the optimal path in any meaningful way. To determine the optimal path, we need to give weights to the welfare of di¤erent individuals by choosing a social welfare function. We do not do this here.
The key observation is that the bubble implements a series of intragenerational and inter-
with e¢ ciency t, while the rest is invested by old …rms with e¢ ciency one.
generational transfers that the government might be able to replicate with …scal policy. In fact,
Equations (17), (28) and (29) provide a simple blueprint for …scal policy to undo the crisis. We now develop this blueprint for our example of section 2, assuming initially that government debt R d t+1 is non-contingent so that Equation (29) holds ex-post and not just in expectation:
1. Suppose that the bubble has burst at time T . Set all …scal variables equal to zero, i.e.
T it = S jt = d t = 0 for t = T; T + 1; :::, i 2 I t and j 2 J t , and use Equations (17) and (28) to describe the desired bubbly equilibrium. Letb t andb N t describe this equilibrium.
2. Then, set the following targets for …scal variables for t = T; T + 1; ::::
Finally, set S T = 0 and distribute T T randomly among the old. 28 This simple algorithm describes the …scal policy that replicates the desired bubbly equilibrium.
When a bubbly episode ends and the economy reverts to the fundamental state withb t =b N t = 0, this …scal policy steps in and keeps the economy in the same growth path. The government issues debt each period with a market value of
, where the last equality follows from Equation (17). Of the revenue raised from the sale of this debt, the government devotes d t = (1 p) b t to repaying bondholders and S N t = (1 p) b t n to subsidizing productive …rms. This scheme is not only feasible but it turns out that T t+1 = b t (1 + n) p < 0 and the government makes pro…ts from running it! Since the economy has not left the pre-crisis growth path, these pro…ts can be used to raise consumption for each generation.
Where are these pro…ts coming from? The proposed …scal policy ensures that the market value of government debt equals that of the disappeared bubble in each period: hence, non-entrepreneurs devote the same resources to purchase the debt than they would have devoted to purchase the bubble. These resources strictly exceed those that are needed to pay maturing debt and to …nance the subsidies that prevent a fall in the net worth of …rms. This is because, unlike the bubble, the government implements these transfers without risk. Hence, the actual interest payments that the government must make to bondholders at each point in time are below the realized return to the bubble during the episode. Likewise, the subsidy that the government must make to productive …rms in order to prevent a fall in their net worth is lower than the one implemented through bubble creation. Government debt is a Ponzi scheme and, as a result, it extracts a transfer from the future just like the bubble. Since government debt never bursts, it does so more e¢ ciently. Does this mean that undoing the crisis is too modest a goal for …scal policy? Should government debt permanently substitute bubbles as a way to help the credit market to work better? A long history of sovereign debt crises around the world and the recent events in European sovereign debt markets strongly suggest a negative answer to this question. To see this, we generalize slightly the example and recognize that shocks to investor sentiment also a¤ect the sovereign debt market. In particular, there are two states for this variable. With probability 1 q, investors expect government debt will be rolled over with a high probability and are willing to purchase it. With probability q, investors expect government debt not to be rolled over and do not purchase it. We have not formally modeled the objectives of the government, and we will abstain from doing so. Instead, we simply assume that the government defaults on its debt if there is a rollover crisis. This makes rollover crises possible. When such a crisis occurs, the government debt vanishes just like bubbles burst at the end of a bubbly episode.
With rollover crises, the blueprint above is still valid provided we slightly generalize the second step as follows: 2'. Then, set the following targets for …scal variables for t = T; T + 1; ::::
with T E t = 0. Finally, set S T = 0 and distribute T T randomly among the old.
The blueprint is basically the same as before, but …scal policy now makes losses if q > p. The probability of a rollover crisis results in the need to pay high interest rates and promise large subsidies. Public promises are so risky that they require the government to raise taxes in every period to keep its policy running. In fact, the policy may become altogether unfeasible if q is su¢ ciently low, since the path of taxation required to sustain it would eventually violate Equation (27) . In this case, government credibility is so low that it is impossible for it to replicate the bubble.
Whenever possible, though, this policy is capable of undoing the crisis. It might certainly fail and generate a sovereign debt crisis. And even if it works, it is inferior to having a bubble. But the model still suggests that it can restore the pre-crisis growth path and this is better than doing nothing. 29
This simple model therefore provides a useful perspective on the current situation of the world economy. As in the blueprint above, the policy response to the crisis has been a massive buildup in government debt. It remains to be seen, however, how much of this buildup has been productively used to raise the net worth of e¢ cient …rms. Overall, it seems clear though that government debt has not proved to be superior to the bubble. The world economy has not yet recovered its pre-crisis growth path and, after the initial buildup, …scal policy has not yielded pro…ts but losses. At the time of writing these note, events seem to have taken a turn for the worse. The market has lost con…dence on governments and the crisis has moved across markets, from private …nancial markets to public-debt markets. The current outlook remains as uncertain as ever.
International transmission
Up to now we have looked at the e¤ects of bubbles on the world economy as a whole, as if borders did not matter. To some extent, this approach seems quite appropriate. The current crisis has propagated across industrial countries with a speed and strength that suggest borders do not matter much anymore. But this is in itself an interesting observation. It raises the question of how shocks to investor sentiment are transmitted across countries. To tackle this question, we break the world economy into various countries.
A reinterpretation of the model
We shall think next of the world economy as containing C countries, indexed by c = 1; :::; C. These countries are split into two groups: high-and low-productivity. Countries in the high-productivity group have an investment e¢ ciency equal to t , while countries in the low-productivity group have an investment e¢ ciency equal to one. Thus, the countries in the high-productivity group contain a fraction " of the world's population and these are the "entrepreneurs" of the world economy.
We need to make assumptions about the geographical extent of markets. It is natural to assume that labor markets are local so that workers can only be hired to work with capital located within the same country. This does not preclude however that goods trade arbitrage away wage di¤erences across countries. In particular, we modify slightly the basic model by assuming that …rms produce output with a Cobb-Douglas technology that uses capital and an intermediate input: Moreover, the equilibrium wage is still given by Equation (4).
Financial markets are global in nature so that individuals and …rms can trade goods and assets with individuals and …rms in other countries. Thus, there is a single world interest rate and set of …rm prices, and it is straightforward to show that these are given by Equations (8) and (13).
At these interest rate and …rm prices, entrepreneurs in the group of high-productivity countries strictly prefer to start new …rms than to lend or purchase old …rms and, as a result, they ask for as much credit as possible. Assume country c belongs to the group of high-productivity countries.
Then, this country will borrow from the rest of the world the following amount:
where s c is the fraction of the world population located in country c. In addition, all the old …rms in country c will be sold to foreigners. At the proposed interest rate and …rm prices, the group of low-productivity countries are indi¤erent between purchasing old …rms at home or abroad, investing in them, and lending if Equation (15) holds. In this reinterpretation of the model bubbles thus help channel resources from low-to high-productivity countries. To verify the conjectured interest rate and prices, we keep assuming that Equation (11) holds.
We can now describe the dynamics of this economy. Aggregating Equation (1), the law of motion of the aggregate or world capital stock k t is still given by Equation (16). Equation (17) describing the dynamics of the aggregate bubble still applies. But it is useful to disaggregate these dynamics at the country level:
where b ct and b N ct be the set of old and new bubbles in country c. Note that, in the group of low-productivity countries, b N ct = 0 since no new …rms are being created there. 31 We have now reinterpreted our model of the world economy as one with many countries. Any sequence for k t ; b ct and b N ct for c = 1; :::; C that satis…es Equations (16) and (31) b N ct is an equilibrium, provided that Equation (11) holds in all dates and states of nature. We examine some of these equilibria next.
International transmission
Now a bubbly episode starts a whole system of country bubbles. We can study such an episode by using a variation of the example developed in section 2. In particular, we assume that during a bubbly episode: (i) bubble creation evolves according to
in the set of high-productivity countries, where ! 2 (0; 1) and ! c is a nonnegative constant that must add up to ! among all productive countries; (ii) in any given period, there is a …xed probability p n that bubble creation stops and n becomes zero thereby ending the bubbly episode, and (iii) in any given period, and for each high-productivity country c, there is a …xed probability p s that the existing stock of bubble bursts, i.e. that b ct = 0. Our process of bubble creation therefore implies that creation in each country depends on both local and global conditions, whereas total bubble creation remains a …xed fraction n of the world bubble. We can think of our example of section 2 as the particular case in which p s = 0. 32
In this generalization of our example, the world equilibrium is still formally described by Equations (18) to (20) , with the only di¤erence that (1 p) now stands for the product (1 p n ) (1 p s ).
Any country bubble is now subject to two types of uncertainty. There is, as in section 2, the risk that investors become pessimistic regarding the worldwide bubble creation as captured by p n : these expectations immediately end the bubbly episode. Beyond that, there is also the risk that investors become pessimistic regarding the value of existing …rms in a particular country as captured by p s : these expectations cause that country's bubble to burst even if the episode in itself continues.
Formally, these country-speci…c changes in sentiment have no e¤ects on the aggregate properties of the bubbly episode but they do a¤ect the distribution of real and …nancial activity throughout the high-productivity world.
To see this, consider that there is a negative shock to investor sentiment that bursts the bubble in country c. On impact, this shock reduces the size of the world bubble. But we have already discussed how, in this type of episode, the current size of the bubble is positively related to expectations regarding bubble creation in the future. By reducing the world bubble, this negative shock is thus immediately transmitted to the value of productive …rms and to their net worth all over the world. Investor pessimism regarding country c therefore brings about a global slowdown: …nancial intermediation contracts worldwide, there is a drop in total capital ‡ows towards the set of developed countries and the e¢ ciency of investment naturally falls as well. This slowdown is somewhat persistent because the initial fall in the capital stock depresses wages all over the world, which lends an additional blow to the net worth of …rms and tightens their borrowing constraints even further. All of these e¤ects are particularly acute in country c since it is there that the fall in net worth is most pronounced.
As painful as the collapse of a country bubble may be, its e¤ects on the real and …nancial aggregates of the world economy are transitory. The reason is that all fundamental features of the bubbly process remain una¤ected: worldwide bubble creation remains a …xed fraction of the aggregate bubble so that, as can be seen from Equation (18), a partial collapse of the bubble has no long-run e¤ects on the dynamics of the episode. Such a collapse also has transitory implications for the distribution of real and …nancial activity. When the bubble bursts in a particular country, our process for b N tc implies that bubble creation is temporarily redirected away from that country towards the rest of the high-productivity world. Other high-productivity countries thus see their rate of bubble creation rise to partially occupy the space of the disappeared one. As wages and the interest rate return to their pre-crisis levels, however, country c eventually recovers from the collapse of its bubble and so does its share of the world bubble, of worldwide bubble creation and of intermediation and entrepreneurial rents.
Figures 7 and 8 show the response of the economy to a such a country-speci…c shock to investor sentiment. The example depicts a world divided into two productive countries of equal size, that we denote by Home (H) and Foreign (F ), and an unproductive rest of the world. Figure 7 illustrates the response of world aggregates to the bursting of the bubble in H, whereas Figure 8 illustrates the responses of the country variables. 33 We have calibrated the bubbly episode so that it is exactly the same as the one in …gure 6. Figure 7 illustrates how the collapse of the bubble in H brings about a worldwide recession. On impact, all …nancial and real indicators fall, including capital, consumption, the stock market and …nancial intermediation. From there, the world economy recovers as the bubble returns to its pre-crisis size. Figure 8 decomposes these e¤ects at the country level. It shows how the recession a¤ects F even though the fall is naturally more severe in H. The …gure also illustrates how the collapse of the bubble in H has transitory e¤ects on the distribution of economic activity between both productive countries.
This example provides an illustration of how changes in investor sentiment regarding a particular country can have global e¤ects. 34 This transmission operates partly through factor markets because the collapse of the bubble in one country depresses wages worldwide, which reduces the net worth of all productive …rms. But it also operates through investor expectations, when changes in investor sentiment regarding one part of the world a¤ect investor sentiment elsewhere. This is a new and powerful channel of transmission of shocks that is absent when, as is customary in macroeconomics, one insists on focusing exclusively on the fundamental equilibrium. 35 Finally, it is worth mentioning that the presence of many countries does not a¤ect the global blueprint for …scal policy that we described in the previous section. It does however raise some new issues such as the sharing of costs and bene…ts from such a policy. We have little to say on this matter, since we have not formally modeled government objectives. But we shall mention two results that follow straight from the model. The …rst one is that government spending should increase in the group of high-productivity countries, but not in the group of low-productivity ones.
The reason is that this spending consists of subsidies to new …rms that raise their collateral. The second result is that, to the extent that countries have di¤erent credibility, government debt should be issued only by the countries with the highest credibility. The reason is that this lowers the cost of …scal policy and the probability of a rollover crisis. This means a possible decoupling between the countries that spend and the ones that borrow and this is likely to lead to frictions among policymakers. This is, we think, as far as we can take the model in these notes in this direction.
Further research on the e¤ects of …scal policy in a world of bubbles is certainly needed.
Concluding remarks
These notes have developed a model of the …nancial accelerator in which bubbly episodes arise in equilibrium. We have used this model to explore a view of the current crisis as a shock to investor sentiment that led to the collapse of a bubble or pyramid scheme in …nancial markets. According to this view, asset prices today depend on market expectations of future asset prices. When investor sentiment is high, asset prices are high and this raises the net worth of …rms, relaxing their credit constraints and improving the allocation of investment. This fosters credit, capital accumulation and consumption. When investor sentiment is low, the opposite occurs: lower asset prices reduce the net worth of …rms, tightening their credit constraints and worsening the allocation of investment.
This leads to a reduction in credit, capital accumulation and consumption.
As a research strategy, viewing the current crisis as the collapse of a bubble is more appealing than alternatives that rely on fundamental or technological shocks. It provides a simple uni…ed narrative of the main macroeconomic developments of the recent past and the current crisis. Namely, the crisis was caused by the collapse of a bubbly episode that had sustained a steady expansion in net worth, output and consumption since the 1990s. This narrative is consistent with the fact that the expansionary phase was gradual and protracted while the recessionary phase has been sudden and sharp. It does not require us to identify a large and negative fundamental or technological shock to blame for the current state of the world economy. It can also account for the connection (or lack of connection!) between …nancial and real economic activity, and the speed and strength with which shocks are transmitted across di¤erent sectors or countries. Finally, it provides us with a simple blueprint for the design of …scal policies to 'undo' the crisis, although it also highlights that these policies rely on government commitment for their success. In the absence of such commitment, these policies might simply move the crisis across markets, from private …nancial markets to public-debt markets.
The analytical framework developed in these notes is useful because it allows us to think through various aspects of the current crisis. Moreover, it can be fruitfully extended in various relevant directions. The …rst one is to introduce a more realistic description of labor markets. The crisis has led to a signi…cant increase in unemployment throughout the world. Our model, with ‡exible wages and a fully inelastic labor supply, has nothing to say about the connection between bubbles and unemployment. The second extension is to introduce money and explore the role of monetary policy in counteracting the crisis. As it stands now, the only role for money in our model would be as a store of value, and there would be little formal distinction between monetary and …scal policy.
To follow current practice in monetary economics, we would need to introduce money as a unit of account and allow for nominal rigidities. A third and …nal extension is to explicitly introduce government objectives and constraints. Political economy issues have played an important role in the unfolding and handling of this crisis. A particularly important observation is that, even though 
